Application of Self-Adaptive techniques to federated authorization models by Bailey, Christopher J.
Author copy - In Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE 2012).  
DOI: 10.1109/ICSE.2012.6227053 
© © 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future 
media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or 
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. 
 
Application of Self-Adaptive Techniques to Federated Authorization Models 
Christopher Bailey 
School of Computing 





Abstract—Authorization infrastructures are an integral 
part of any network where resources need to be protected. As 
organisations start to federate access to their resources, 
authorization infrastructures become increasingly difficult to 
manage, to a point where relying only on human resources 
becomes unfeasible. In our work, we propose a Self-Adaptive 
Authorization Framework (SAAF) that is capable of 
monitoring the usage of resources, and controlling access to 
resources through the manipulation of authorization assets 
(e.g., authorization policies, access rights and sessions), due to 
the identification of abnormal usage. As part of this work, we 
explore the use of models for facilitating the autonomic 
management of federated authorization infrastructures by 1) 
classifying access behaviour exhibited by users, 2) modelling 
authorization assets, including usage, for identifying abnormal 
behaviour, and 3) managing authorization through the 
adaptation and reflection of modelled authorization assets. 
SAAF will be evaluated by integrating it into an existing 
authorization infrastructure that would allow the simulation of 
abnormal usage scenarios.  
Keywords-self-adaptation; model driven engineering; model 
transformation; authorization; computing security 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Organisations use authorization infrastructures to 
protect, control and monitor access to electronic resources. 
There exist a variety of approaches to authorization, such as, 
role based access control (RBAC) [1], and attribute based 
access control (ABAC) [2]. Each rely upon traditional 
methods of management, whereby human administrators 
monitor audit logs, and make changes to access control rules 
or user access rights manually (and reactively) based on 
what they observe. Administrators analyse audit logs, 
primarily conveying usage statistics of user access requests, 
to ensure access is being used as expected.  
As organisations federate their access, by which they 
share their resources with other organisations across a 
distributed infrastructure, the number of users with access 
increases dramatically. This enforces the need for more 
efficient management of access control, as it is known that 
an authorized user can cause far greater damage in 
comparison to an external attacker, due to their access rights 
[3]. As exhibited through the use of alternative solutions 
aimed at improving authorization management, such as 
usage control (UCON) [4] and intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) [5], human controllers alone are not capable of 
effectively managing authorization infrastructures. Despite 
these solutions, few automated mechanisms exist, such as, 
active IDSs [5], for mitigating, or preventing further 
abnormal usage. In these cases, the extent of what can be 
done is minimal compared to the full scope of an 
authorization infrastructure. 
Autonomic management has been identified as a 
potential solution for improving traditional authorization 
management. It reduces the need for human controllers by 
automating management activities, such as, identifying 
misuse of access rights and responding appropriately, 
assessing the state of the authorization infrastructure, and 
ensuring sufficient and relevant access is available to its 
users. We propose a model for facilitating autonomic 
management of authorization activities. This is achieved by 
modelling of authorization assets (e.g., access control rules, 
access rights, and access sessions), modelling usage, and 
controlling authorization through autonomic management 
decisions. The use of models allows an autonomic controller 
to reason about the state of authorization (such as, current 
active access control rules and any abnormal usage 
attributed to them) by, guiding how the authorization 
infrastructure should be adapted in order to manage access 
to resources.  
This research investigates the role of models when 
automating the management of federated authorization 
infrastructures. The motivation for using models is that 
these infrastructures provide opportunities for modelling 
complex adaptation situations where the need for autonomic 
management is significant. This research will be performed 
in the context of the Self-Adaptive Authorization 
Framework (SAAF) [6] whose objective is to monitor and 
control the assets of federated authorization infrastructures. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 
2, we identify the research problem and our expected 
contribution. Section 3 describes our proposed approach, 
including methodologies and evaluation plan. Section 4 
outlines our current work. In Section 5, we comment upon 
related work, and finally, Section 6 concludes by 
summarising what has been achieved so far, and indicates 
lines for future research. 
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II. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION 
As identified in the introduction, there is motivation to 
improve traditional management of federated authorization 
by automating management activities. The concept of 
federated authorization implies organisations that share 
access conform to one authorization model, however each 
organisation will implement that authorization model 
differently, utilising their own formats for authorization 
policies, and store user access rights in their own way. The 
research problem can be split into two parts: 1) how to 
manage authorization over a federated infrastructure, 
regarding what can be controlled and what can be used to 
assess the need for change, and 2) how autonomy can be 
integrated with the management of a federated authorization 
infrastructure, considering the various underlying 
technologies and implementations employed by the 
participating organisations. 
Our contribution is the definition of a model that 
represents a federated RBAC/ABAC authorization 
infrastructure, extended to classify adaptation situations 
(modelling unexpected behaviour) and controls to govern 
adaptations (adaptation goals). Through modelling the target 
infrastructure, we capture the authorization state, and assess 
such state against expected usage in order to trigger the need 
for adaptation. Modelling also provides support for 
reasoning about the target infrastructure by separating the 
different adaptation activities from its application specific 
implementation. This can be achieved through model 
transformation, which also allows the usage of specific 
techniques and tools that are associated with different 
adaptation activities. These activities include the detection 
of abnormal behaviour, the analysis of the alternative 
solutions, the decision of what measures to take, and the 
execution of these adaptations in a federated authorization 
infrastructure. 
III. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The proposed approach involves the design and 
development of a Self-Adaptive Authorization Framework 
(SAAF) [6] that implements the MAPE-K feedback control 
loop [7][8]. The aim of SAAF is to manage RBAC/ABAC 
authorization infrastructures by monitoring and controlling 
authorization assets. SAAF builds a model of usage patterns 
collected by monitoring user access requests. It identifies 
abnormal behaviour when patterns of usage no longer 
conform to what is expected (such as, rates of requests over 
time). As a response, SAAF adapts manageable 
authorization assets in order to react to abnormal behaviour, 
and manage future access control decisions. 
SAAF is positioned to work with a distributed 
RBAC/ABAC authorization infrastructure in order to 
encompass federated access. This presents an opportunity to 
model the state of authorization in a distributed 
environment, and apply SAAF in a decentralised manner 
[9], as multiple sensors and effectors will be required to 
interface with various authorization services.  
A. Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model (figure 1) provides an abstraction 
of a federated RBAC/ABAC authorization infrastructure 
[10]. It captures the necessary authorization services (such 
as the Policy Decision Point) and authorization assets (such 
as policies) that enable a subject (an authenticated user) to 
gain access to an organisation’s resources. A subject’s 
access rights is managed by their organisation’s Attribute 
Authority (AA), which assigns attributes (such as the role of 
‘Staff’) and generates credentials for its subjects. A 
credential is a signed declaration of a subject’s access right, 
providing information about who assigned this subject 
access. The AA’s credential issuing policy governs which 
attributes a subject within their organisation can have. When 
a subject wishes to access a resource they request access 
through the resource’s Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The 
PEP communicates with the Credential Validation Service 
(CVS) and Policy Decision Point (PDP) in order to be 
informed if the subject can have access. The role of the CVS 
is to identify if a trusted AA has signed the subject’s 
credential. It validates the credential against its credential 
validation policy and returns any valid attributes the subject 
has. The PDP then uses these valid attributes to assess if the 
subject has the necessary rights to access the resource, in 
accordance to its access control policy.  
With respect to SAAF, the conceptual model identifies 
what can be controlled to realise management decisions, and 
what can be used to assess the need for management 
decisions. There are 3 services that can be controlled: 
Attribute Authorities (AA), Credential Validation Services 
(CVS) and the Policy Decision Points (PDP). By adapting 
an AA’s credential issuing policies, SAAF can manage an 
individual subject’s access rights. Adaptation of a CVS’s 
credential validation policies allows SAAF to control what 
AAs can be trusted to manage access. Finally, adaptation of 
a PDP’s access control policies allows SAAF to control the 
specific attributes needed for any subject, from any 
organisation, to access any resource. To assess the need for 
management decisions there are two types of assets that 
must exist, these being user access requests and the 
corresponding access control decisions. These assets allow 
for the analysis of user behaviour, through relating requests 
by a subject, over time. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Distributed RBAC/ABAC Infrastructure  
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B. Autonomic Management  
A solution to automated management relies on 4 
activities. The first activity is Trigger Adaptation that 
identifies the need for a change to the target authorization 
infrastructure.  This is achieved through monitoring usage 
of the authorization infrastructure and modelling user 
behaviour in conjunction with behavioural rules. For 
example, a behaviour rule might state that no subject may 
request access to a particular resource beyond a given 
threshold, related to the frequency of access requests. 
Should this threshold be violated abnormal behaviour is 
identified. 
The second activity is Generate Solutions, whereby 
multiple solutions are generated to address the identified 
abnormal behaviour. Within the scope of the conceptual 
model, there is a finite set of actions that can be executed 
against an authorization infrastructure. The actions can be 
modelled in a decision tree, where actions are grouped to 
form solutions. For example, remove rule from policy and 
revoke credential from subject. 
The Solution Selection activity identifies the most 
relevant solution for the abnormal behaviour, as each 
solution will have varying degrees of cost, considering a 
single attribute decision maker. For example, removing all 
access control rules will prevent a user from continuing 
malicious activity, however, it will also impact the entire 
user base unnecessarily. An alternative solution whereby 
only the user’s access is impacted would be more relevant 
since the incurring cost would be lower. However, this 
selection has to be considered in the context of allowing the 
behaviour to continue.  
Finally, Plan Generation is the process of creating a 
step-by-step plan that can be executed in order to realise the 
chosen solution against the authorization infrastructure. The 
plan is executed with the use of multiple effectors that can 
control authorization services, such as, updating an access 
control policy used by a Policy Decision Point.   
C. Evaluation Plan 
SAAF’s ability to manage an authorization infrastructure 
will be evaluated using heuristics and measurements by 
executing expected/unexpected usage scenarios. The 
scenarios may capture the time required to identify 
abnormal usage, the time required to react to abnormal 
usage, and the impact that the adaptation might have upon 
the infrastructure. For example, measuring the number of 
subjects belonging to an authorization infrastructure that 
have been impacted unnecessarily. Success will be achieved 
through comparison against traditional management 
techniques, where a human operator attempts to identify and 
resolve the same scenarios observed by SAAF. 
To ensure results are valid, the evaluation scenarios 
applied to SAAF are modelled on real world events where it 
is known users have carried out abnormal or malicious 
usage. The historic actions of the human operators will be 
simulated against the same usage scenarios, and compared 
against SAAF’s own actions. Each controller will be 
assessed using the same heuristics and measurements. 
IV. CURRENT WORK 
A. PERMIS Integration 
Our current work is focused on the design and 
development of SAAF and integration into the PERMIS 
[10] authorization infrastructure, which is based on a 
distributed RBAC/ABAC model. PERMIS is chosen due to 
its ability to operate with various technologies and different 
policy formats, allowing for simulation of multiple 
implementations of RBAC/ABAC. It also provides the 
necessary effectors for SAAF to control authorization 
services, such as, a policy manager to activate and 
deactivate authorization policies that belong to the 
credential validation service and policy decision point.  
B. Model Transformation 
SAAF’s integration into PERMIS requires the target 
authorization infrastructure, like PERMIS (or any 
RBAC/ABAC authorization infrastructure), to be modelled 
in order to reason and manipulate its state. Model driven 
engineering (MDE) [11] presents a favourable option in 
order to model authorization assets, manipulate these 
models at run-time, and reflect [12] eventual changes into 
authorization infrastructure (through model transformation).  
Figure 2, based on the MDE model transformation 
process [11], explores one aspect of model transformation in 
which we transform SAAF’s view of the authorization 
infrastructure, with respect to SAAF’s policy model. The 
policy model provides an abstraction of implemented 
RBAC/ABAC authorization policies, allowing SAAF to 
carry out management decisions without knowledge of 
implementation. Once SAAF has analysed the state of the 
authorization infrastructure in accordance to the policy 
model, the policy model is adapted as a result of SAAF 
reacting to abnormal behaviour. This requires the policy 
model to be reflected against the target authorization 
infrastructure. A transformation program generates a policy 
 
Figure 2. Applying model transformation to generate PERMIS policies 
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in the target authorization infrastructure’s own policy format 
(in this case PERMIS), from the SAAF policy model. As 
part of the transformation the generated policy is validated 
against the target’s policy schema (i.e., the PERMIS policy 
schema). With regards to SAAF, this activity is carried out 
as part of the plan execution, which uses effectors to 
activate policies generated through model transformation. 
V. RELATED WORK 
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any 
other work that utilises self-adaptation as a means for 
managing authorization infrastructures. However, there are 
several techniques that improve upon traditional 
authorization management. Usage control (UCON) extends 
traditional authorization in order to limit what a user can do 
in terms of requesting access [4]. As a proactive means for 
limiting abnormal behaviour, the approach does not support 
any type of run-time adaptation to an authorization 
infrastructure, such as, active response when abnormal 
behaviour is detected. For example, if one user continually 
reaches their usage limit this violation could be considered 
as malicious behaviour, requiring the need for permanent 
removal of the user’s access rights. UCON remains static in 
this case, whereas self-adaptation would identify the need 
for access right removal, and modify the infrastructure 
accordingly. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) also can be 
used to improve traditional authorization management 
techniques [5]. These identify when and where malicious 
usage has taken place. Some IDSs actively react to these 
attacks in a minimalistic manner, for example, by adding 
firewall rules in light of an identified attack. IDSs are 
limited in terms of the input criteria to assess attacks, such 
as, network traffic. Our solution differs as it operates at a 
higher level, where more meaningful information can be 
analysed to produce clearer and precise decisions, within the 
full scope of authorization infrastructures. 
Our proposal builds upon several other related works, 
although not necessarily directly connected to autonomic 
authorization management. One of these contributions is the 
UML representation of RBAC, which provides a re-usable 
RBAC model [13]. It incorporates OCL constraints, and 
RBAC policy patterns to allow instantiation of polices into 
an RBAC system. Although, primarily aimed for supporting 
design at development-time, it nevertheless provides a good 
basis for defining a model that can be used with SAAF. 
There is also SECTET-PL [14], a policy language 
interpreted as UML, to be used with model driven 
engineering. The goal is to align security business 
objectives (seen as our behavioural rules) with a target 
system through model transformation, which shares some 
similarities with our work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the context of our Self-Adaptive Authorization 
Framework (SAAF), this paper has proposed the use of 
models as a means for automating the management 
activities of authorization infrastructures. The modelling of 
federated authorization infrastructures and their usage, 
allows SAAF to reason about the state of the authorization 
infrastructure, in order to assess if the state of authorization 
must change. For example, if a number of users carry out 
malicious behaviour against the authorization infrastructure 
(exhibited through their access requests), the state of 
authorization must change to further prevent such 
behaviour. Our current work is focused on integrating 
SAAF with a federated authorization infrastructure by using 
model driven engineering to facilitate reasoning about the 
state of authorization, and providing seamless interaction 
with multiple organisations. The use of models will be 
evaluated through the implementation of SAAF, where 
autonomic management can be demonstrated against a 
federated authorization infrastructure. 
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